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This paper analyzes the equilibrium growth paths of two economies that are identical in
all respects, except for the organization of their …nancial systems: in particular, one has a
competitive banking system and the other has a monopolistic banking system. In addition,
the sources of ine¢ciencies, as a result of monopoly banking, and their relationship to the
existence of credit rationing are explored. Monopoly in banking tends to depress the equi-
librium law of motion for the capital stock for either of two reasons. When credit rationing
exists, monopoly banks ration credit more heavily than competitive banks. When credit
is not rationed, the existence of monopoly banking leads to excessive monitoring of credit
…nanced investment. Both of these have adverse consequences for capital accumulation. In
addition, monopoly banking is more likely to lead to credit rationing than is competitive
banking. Finally, the scope for development trap phenomena to arise is considered under
both a competitive and a monopolistic banking system.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent empirical work in the …eld of …nancial intermediation and economic growth has
established a strong, positive association between the development of an economy’s formal
…nancial sector and its level (or rate of growth) of real activity.1 There is also a well-
developed theoretical literature exploring the nature of this correlation.2 However, most
of the literature on the interrelationships between intermediation and growth considers an
economy possessing a competitive banking system. As a practical matter though, di¤erent
economies display variation in the industrial structure of their banking systems.
Consequently, more recent theoretical works have begun to examine and compare the
macroeconomic di¤erences between economies with competitive banking systems and those
with monopolistic banking systems.3 The results of these works are mixed. Partial equi-
librium models, such as Riordan (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1995), Caminal and Matutes
(1997) and Schnitzer (1998a,b), …nd that under monopoly, the severity of the particular
bank-borrower problem examined is reduced. In contrast, the general equilibrium models
…nd that less competitive systems may be detrimental to the economy. Smith (1998) analyzes
the e¤ect of bank structure on income and the business cycle and …nds that less competitive
systems are bad for the economy. Cetorelli (1995, 1997) explores the e¤ect of bank structure
on (a) the …nancing of credit-constrained …rms and the adoption of new and better technolo-
gies, and on (b) the screening process for new loans, respectively. In both papers he …nds the
impact of monopoly in banking to be ambiguous. A monopoly bank facilitates technology
adoption and reduces screening costs; however, these bene…ts are o¤set by the redistribution
of productive resources to the bank in the form of pro…ts.
The purpose of this paper is to further extend this literature by examining how the market
structure of the banking system impacts capital accumulation and economic growth — in
the context of a simple, general equilibrium model which allows for credit rationing. More
speci…cally, the performance of an economy with a monopolistic banking system is compared
to that of an economy whose banking system is competitive. The primary focus of this
comparison is the level of long-run real activity. Related to this, this paper also compares
the potential for credit to be rationed, the rates of interest paid on loans and deposits,
and the quantity of resources required to operate the banking system. The possibility for
development trap phenomena to arise under each type of …nancial system is also explored.
In general, this paper shows that the existence of a monopolistic banking system will
be detrimental to both capital accumulation and economic growth. However, of particular
interest for this paper is understanding how this is related to the existence and nature of
any credit rationing that may arise. Speci…cally, the following …ve results are obtained.
First, the existence of monopoly power in banking tends to depress the equilibrium law of
1See, for instance, Cameron (1967), Goldsmith (1969), Atje and Jovanovic (1993), King and Levine
(1993a,b), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996), or Levine and Zervos (1996).
2See, for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991, 1993), and Boyd and
Smith (1997, 1998). For an overview of some of this literature see Pagano (1993), Greenwood and Smith
(1995), and Levine (1996).
3Competitiveness in the banking sector is also explored in Krasa and Villamil (1992), Winton (1995, 1997),
and Yanelle (1997). These papers examine the optimal size, number, and capitalization of banks. However,
they do not focus on the relationship between bank structure and capital accumulation and growth.
1motion for the capital stock and thus reduces the level of long-run real activity, for either
of two reasons. When credit rationing arises, a monopoly bank rations credit more heavily
than does a competitive banking system and when credit is not rationed, the existence of
monopoly banking leads to excessive monitoring of credit …nanced investment; both of these
have adverse consequences for capital accumulation. Second, monopoly banking is more
likely to lead to credit rationing. Third, if there does exist credit rationing, the interest rate
paid on deposits will be lower under a monopolistic banking system. However, when there is
a monopoly bank and credit is not rationed, the interest rate charged on loans will be higher.
Fourth, the amount of resources consumed by the banking sector (as a result of monitoring
investment projects) will be greatest in an economy with monopoly banking. Finally, while
development trap phenomena may arise under either banking system, they are less likely to
occur and will be less severe in an economy with a competitive banking system.
This paper di¤ers in focus and methodology from the more recent works comparing com-
petitive and monopolistic banking systems. The primary di¤erence lies in the role that credit
rationing (both its existence and nature) plays in the economy. These other recent models
either do not include scope for credit rationing to occur, or allow for credit rationing that
di¤ers signi…cantly from that presented in this paper.4 While credit rationing is not the focus
of this paper, its presence (or absence) does play a crucial role in understanding the sources
and nature of those ine¢ciencies arising from a monopoly bank. Monopoly in banking (as in
most industries) tends to be detrimental to the economy because it drives a wedge between
interest rates charged on loans and those paid on deposits; thus the resulting monopoly
pro…ts divert resources away from capital accumulation and growth. This paper shows that
the nature of this wedge5 depends crucially on whether there exists credit rationing in the
economy and, equally as important, the type of credit rationing present.6 It also illustrates
situations where, in spite of this wedge, the economy is not adversely a¤ected. Thus this
paper sheds new light on exactly why monopoly in banking is bad when the economy is
characterized as one which allows for credit rationing.
In order to analyze these issues, a variant of Diamond’s (1965) neoclassical growth model,
in which capital investment must be credit …nanced, is utilized. The activity of producing
capital is also subject to a standard costly state veri…cation (CSV) problem of the type intro-
duced by Townsend (1979); the formulation employed here most closely resembles Diamond
(1984), Williamson (1986) and Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998). As in those papers, credit is
4For example, Petersen and Rajan (1995) allow for credit rationing in a Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) frame-
work. However, the basic framework of their model and underlying reasons for the existence of credit
rationing di¤er signi…cantly from this paper. Consequently, their results, that a monopoly is less likely to
lead to credit rationing, are the reverse of the results obtained in this paper. In addition, they do not examine
the impact of market structure and credit rationing on capital accumulation and growth. See Williamson
(1986) for a discussion of how the underlying framework and assumptions of a Stiglitz and Weiss model di¤er
signi…cantly and substantially from that of the costly state veri…cation type model used in this paper.
5The “nature of the wedge” refers to whether the di¤erence in interest rates is a result of the monopoly
bank charging a higher rate on loans, or paying a lower rate on deposits, or both as compared to a competitive
bank.
6In this paper credit rationing can occur for one of two reasons. There could be insu¢cient income –
meaning that if all the income in the economy was added together, there still would not be enough funds to
meet borrower’s needs – or insu¢cient savings – meaning that there is enough income, but that not enough
of it is being channeled through the formal …nancial sector to borrowers.
2e¢ciently allocated through …nancial intermediaries.
In this context, banks accept deposits from a group of individuals (lenders) who earn labor
income when young, and save for retirement in old age. Banks make loans to a group of
individuals (borrowers) who have access to stochastic investment technologies which convert
current output into future capital. Borrowers require external funds to operate these projects
and, as noted, the lending involved is subject to a CSV problem. In particular, the return
on any borrower’s investment can be observed by the lender only if a …xed cost is incurred.
Two possibilities with respect to the industrial organization of the banking system are
then considered: banking may be either competitive or monopolistic. It is assumed that a
monopoly bank has monopoly power in the market for both loans and deposits. Interestingly,
a monopoly bank will always exercise its powers in one of these markets, but not necessarily
in both markets simultaneously. The di¤erences between a competitive and monopolistic
banking system then derive from the extent to which a monopoly bank chooses to restrict
the supply of loans made (the rationing of credit), the amount of deposits raised (the size of
the formal …nancial sector), and the extent to which a monopoly bank chooses to monitor
loans (resources required to operate the bank).
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. The basic model is outlined in sec-
tion 2, while section 3 discusses credit and factor markets. A monopoly banking system
is described and analyzed in sections 4 and 5, while sections 6 and 7 do the same for a
competitive banking system. Section 8 compares the two banking systems while section 9
concludes. Proofs of selected propositions and lemmas are relegated to the appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
This paper considers a two period lived, overlapping generations model with production.
Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ;1;2::: In each period a single …nal good, which is
either consumed or invested, is produced using capital and labor inputs according to the
constant returns to scale production function F (K;L).L e t f (k)=F (k;1) denote the
intensive production function, where k = K /L is the capital-labor ratio. It is assumed
that f (k) is increasing, strictly concave, satis…es f (0) = 0, and that the standard Inada
conditions hold. Finally, it is assumed that capital is used in the production process each
period, and that it then depreciates completely.
Each generation is composed of a continuum of agents having unit mass. Within each
generation individuals are divided into two groups: borrowers and lenders. All individuals,
regardless of the group into which they fall, are identical with respect to their preferences;
they value only old age consumption and are risk neutral. It will be assumed that only
lenders are endowed with one unit of labor when young. No individuals in either group is
endowed with labor when old. In addition, both borrowers and lenders are endowed with
an investment opportunity when young; the exact nature of these opportunities is described
in greater detail below. The initial old generation has an aggregate capital endowment of
K0 > 0; while subsequent generations have no endowments of either capital or …nal goods.
32.1 Borrowers
Af r a c t i o n1 ¡ ® of individuals within any given generation are potential borrowers (entre-
preneurs). They have access to a stochastic linear investment technology which, for every
unit of …nal good invested in the technology at date t, yields z units of capital at date t+1.7
The return z is an iid random variable drawn from the distribution G(¢),w h i c hi sa s s u m e d






Any borrower’s investment return is private information. However, any lender can ascertain
the return z by incurring a …xed cost °>0 units of capital.8 Finally, it is assumed that each
borrower is endowed with only one, indivisible investment project. This technology requires
exactly q>0 units of funds to operate.9 Since borrowers have no funds of their own, their
capital investments must be …nanced externally.
2.2 Lenders
Lenders, who constitute a fraction ® of each generation, are di¤erentiated from borrowers
in two respects. First, unlike borrowers, lenders supply one unit of labor inelastically when
young, earning the real wage rate wt at date t: Since only old age consumption is valued,
lenders save their entire young period income and consume the gross return on that savings
when old. Savings takes place by either depositing wage earnings in a bank or by investing
in an autarkic (individual speci…c) capital production technology.
Second, lenders’ access to these individual speci…c investment technologies di¤ers from
those available to borrowers. In particular, for each unit of the …nal good invested by lender
i at date t; vi units of capital are received at date t+1: The return vi i sk n o w ni na d v a n c eb y
lender i; but is private information and cannot be veri…ed by other individuals at any cost.
Let H (v) denote the fraction of the lender population with vi · v; and let h(v) ´ H0 (v):
It is assumed that h(v) > 0 holds for v 2 [0; ¹ v]; and that h(v)=0otherwise. For much of
the paper it will be assumed that the values vi are uniformly distributed in the population,
so that H (v)=v/¹ v:Finally, lenders can operate their projects at any scale.10
7The capital obtained from investment projects (including that of lenders) is then used in the production
process to produce …nal goods. These …nal goods are either consumed (by old borrowers and lenders) or
used (by young workers) in future investment projects.
8The assumption that monitoring consumes capital follows Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
9The assumption of a …xed project size follows Williamson (1986, 1987), Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
and Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998). For papers that allow for variable loan size (and variable project size),
see Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Gray and Wu (1995).
10The purpose of giving lenders di¤erent investment returns is to generate an upward sloping supply curve
of deposits for intermediaries. The device employed here closely follows that utilized by Williamson (1986).
In addition, we want to think of lenders’ investment opportunities as being inferior to those of borrowers:
the “entrepreneurs” in the economy. Parenthetically, the use of autarkic investment technologies by lenders
can be thought of as an “informal …nancial sector.”
43T r a d e
Trade occurs in one of two markets: competitive factor markets, where capital and labor are
traded, and a formal credit market, where funds are transferred from lenders to borrowers.
Trade in each market is now described
3.1 Factor Markets
At each date capital and labor are traded in competitive factor markets. Thus, at time t the
real wage, wt; and the rental rate of capital, ½t, both equal their marginal products:
½t = f
0 (kt) (1)
wt = f (kt) ¡ ktf
0(kt) ´ w(kt): (2)
Clearly the real wage is an increasing function of the capital-labor ratio, i.e. w0 (kt) > 0.I t
will be assumed that w(kt) satis…es
w
0 (0) >C ; (A.1)
and
w
00 (kt) < 0 (A.2)
for all kt ¸ 0.11 Assumption (A.2) is satis…ed by any CES production function with an
elasticity of substitution greater than or equal to one.12
3.2 Credit Market
It is assumed that all transfers of funds between borrowers and lenders are intermediated.13
This intermediation may be undertaken either by a monopolistic or a competitive banking
system; each possibility is considered below. First, however, the contractual relationship
between borrowers and …nancial intermediaries as well as the relationship between lenders
and banks are described.
3.2.1 Borrowers
Since borrowers have no young period income, they must obtain external …nancing to operate
their projects. To obtain funding, borrowers can be thought of as entering into contractual
relationships with …nancial intermediaries (banks). Following Williamson (1986, 1987), it
is assumed that borrowers announce contract terms, which can then be either accepted or
11The value of C is determined by di¤erentiating the right hand side of equation (21) and setting the result
greater than one; i.e. C =1/ ®[^ z ¡ (° /q)G(´)]
12Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) are similar to the conditions used to guarantee the existence and uniqueness
of a nontrivial steady state in the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations model.
13With competitive …nancial intermediaries, such an outcome will occur in any event to economize on mon-
itoring costs; on this point see Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986). The possibility of unintermediated
lending in the presence of a monopolistic intermediary is not explored here.
5rejected by any intermediary. When a borrower’s contract announcement is accepted, the
borrower obtains q units of the …nal good and undertakes his project.
Loan contracts are exactly analogous to those described by Williamson (1986, 1987), and
specify the following sets of objects. First, there is a set At of realized returns for which state
veri…cation will occur; by the same token Bt =[ 0 ; ¹ z] ¡ At is the set of return realizations
for which veri…cation is not undertaken.14 When state veri…cation does occur (z 2 At),t h e
repayment speci…ed by the contract can meaningfully be made contingent on the project
return; this repayment is denoted by Rt (z); per unit borrowed. When state veri…cation
does not occur (z 2 Bt) loan repayments cannot meaningfully be conditioned on project
returns; hence the contract calls for an uncontingent payment xt in this event. Moreover, in
order for a borrower to truthfully reveal when a monitoring state has occurred, it is necessary
that
Rt (z) · xt (3)
hold, for all z 2 At. Finally, feasibility of contract announcements requires that loan repay-
ments not exceed the proceeds of a borrower’s investment; therefore









At date t, young lenders earn the wage income w(kt) ¸ 0, all of which is saved. This savings
takes place either through a …nancial intermediary, or through lenders investing autarkically
in their individual speci…c investment projects.
A lender’s decision concerning whether to invest in his own project or to deposit his
earnings with a …nancial intermediary depends on the expected returns from both options.
Let rt+1 be the gross return on deposits between t and t +1 , which lenders take as given.
Each lender compares this return with the return to …nancing his own investment project; for
lender i this return is ½t+1vi, measured in units of consumption. Therefore, lender i invests
in his own project if and only if
rt+1 <v i½t+1: (5)







gives the fraction of the lender population for which equation (5) is satis…ed,







14Note that I abstract from stochastic state veri…cation, as in Diamond (1984), Williamson (1986, 1987),
and Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998). See Townsend (1979), Border and Sobel (1987), Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), Mookherjee and Png (1989), and Boyd and Smith (1994) for papers which discuss stochastic state
veri…cation and its implications. Finally, Krasa and Villamil (2000) detail conditions under which simple
debt contracts and stochastic contracts are optimal.
15In addition, at date t a borrower generates a positive expected return from operating his project if and
only if the expected project return (in terms of …nal goods), q^ z½t+1, is at least as great as the expected costs
of borrowing funds, q
R
At Rt (z)g(z)dz + q
R
Bt xtg(z)dz. Hence, borrowers will undertake their projects if
and only if q^ z½t+1 ¡ q
R
At Rt (z)g(z)dz ¡ q
R
Bt xtg(z)dz ¸ 0 holds.
63.2.3 Financial Intermediation
The following functions are performed by the …nancial intermediary, regardless of the market
structure of the banking system. Financial intermediaries take deposits from lenders, make
loans to borrowers, and conduct monitoring of project returns as required by loan contracts.
In order to compare the macroeconomic impact of the di¤erent bank structures, it will
be necessary to ascertain two things. First, under what conditions does one obtain either of
the two types of credit rationing possible in the model? Second, what are the interest rates
charged on loans and the interest rates paid on deposits? The following four sections are
devoted to ascertaining these things for both monopolistic and competitive banking systems.
4 A Monopoly Banking System
For the purposes of this paper, the bank can be thought of as deriving its monopoly power
from an exclusive charter granted by the government.16 It is also assumed that uninterme-
diated borrowing and lending is impossible — either for legal reasons or because the implied
duplication of monitoring e¤ort makes unintermediated lending uneconomical. Moreover,
since there is only a single bank, it is not only a monopolist in the market for loans, but it
is a monopsonist in the market for deposits as well.
Since each funded borrower obtains a loan of size q; the bank’s expected real repayment














At Rt (z)g(z)dz +
R
Bt xtg (z)dz represents the expected repayment implied by the






g (z)dz represents the expected monitoring
costs associated with this contract.
Let ¹t 2 [0;1] denote the fraction of borrowers funded by the bank at date t.T h e n












while its costs equal (1 ¡ ®)q¹trt+1. Hence the bank chooses values ¹t and rt+1 along with






















subject to equations (3), (4),






16Similar to Smith (1998), who obtains the bank charter and how they obtain it are not explicitly modeled
in this paper. It is assumed, however, that if the charter is sold to an individual or group, the proceeds from
the sale of the charter are not rebated to any individuals in the economy. One can think of the charter as
being acquired by a young lender at date t; who consumes the pro…ts generated by the bank at date t +1 :
See Krasa and Villamil (1992) for a more detailed discussion regarding the optimal size and market structure
of banks in a costly state veri…cation model.
7and ¹t 2 [0;1]: Equation (6) guarantees that the monopoly bank cannot lend out more funds
than it acquires.
The solution to this problem is for borrowers to o¤er “a standard debt contract.” In
particular, if it is feasible to repay the …xed amount xt — principle plus interest on the loan
— then the borrower does so. Otherwise he defaults on his debt, the bank veri…es the state,
and it retains all of the proceeds from his project. More formally we have17
Proposition 1 The optimal loan contract must satisfy








It remains to describe the (gross) interest rate charged on loans, xt, by a monopoly lender.









































The function ¼ (¢) gives the bank’s per unit expected return, inclusive of monitoring costs,
( m e a s u r e di nt e r m so fc a p i t a l )a saf u n c t i o no ft h el o a nr a t e ,xt, and the future price of
capital, ½t+1. Clearly it will be useful to make some assumptions regarding the properties of
the function ¼(¢).I tw i l lb ea s s u m e dt h a t
¼











½t+1.18 Assumptions (A.3) and (A.4) imply that ¼ (¢) has the con…guration de-
picted in Figure 1.19 Consequently, there exists a unique value of xt, depending on ½t+1,
17The proof of this proposition is similar to the ones found in Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson
(1986, 1987); hence it is omitted here.
18Assumption (A.4) is equivalent to the more primitive assumption that g (z)+( ° /q)g0 (z) > 0 holds for
all z:
19These assumptions are identical to those found in Boyd and Smith (1998) and result in a graph of the
expected return to the bank which is identical (although for di¤erent reasons) to that found in Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981).









































where ´>0 is a constant satisfying 1 ¡ (° /q)g (´) ¡ G(´)=0 :
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that a monopoly bank will choose xt, rt+1,a n d










subject to equation (6). Obviously, the bank will extract as much surplus as possible from



















subject to equation (6) and the requirement that 1 ¸ ¹t ¸ 0. Rearranging terms in equation
(6) and substituting the result into the maximand, it is apparent that rt+1 must be chosen






















Notice that equation (10) will hold with equality if and only if ¹t =1 : Also note that there
is no reason for the bank to set rt+1 above ¹ v½t+1, the maximum return obtainable from any
lender’s investment project; thus 0 · rt+1 · ¹ v½t+1 will be satis…ed.
In order to guarantee that the objective function in (MBP0) is concave, I will henceforth


















20It is straightforward to show that at this interest rate the bank never extracts enough surplus to deter
borrowers from operating their projects.
9Assumption (A.5) is satis…ed if, for example, investment returns are uniformly distributed
in the lender population.21
If the solution to (MBP0)h a s¹t < (=)1, then all borrowers are not (are) funded. Fol-
lowing standard usage, this outcome is referred to as exhibiting credit rationing (no credit









mains to determine when credit rationing arises and what will be the interest rate paid on
deposits, (rt+1).
4.1 Equilibrium Deposit Rate without Credit Rationing
In the absence of credit rationing, ¹¤
t =1holds. Therefore, a monopoly bank will o¤er
exactly the interest rate on deposits that just enables it to fund all borrowers; hence the




















4.2 Equilibrium Deposit Rate with Credit Rationing
When credit is rationed, ¹¤
t < 1 holds. As a consequence, the constraint (10) does not bind






























and equality obtains if r¤
t+1 < ¹ v½t+1:22 When the distribution of investment returns in the





½t+1Ã/2 ;i f Ã · 2¹ v
½t+1¹ v;i f Ã ¸ 2¹ v
: (14)









[aw(kt)Ã]/[(1¡ ®)q2¹ v] ; Ã · 2¹ v
[aw(kt)]/[(1 ¡ ®)q] ; Ã ¸ 2¹ v
:
21Assumptions on lenders’ returns (A.5) and on lenders’ returns relative to borrowers’ returns (A.6) are
required because, unlike the previous literature, lenders are given non-trivial, di¤erentiated options regarding
what to do with their wage income. A uniform distribution is used throughout the remained of the paper
only for ease of exposition. Any distribution which satis…es assumption A.5 would work and would not alter
the general results.
22Clearly there is no reason for the bank to pay an interest rate on deposits in excess of ¹ v½t+1; it will pay
strictly less than that amount when it is not optimal to fully tap the potential supply of deposits.
104.3 Conditions Necessary for Credit Rationing
There are two possible reasons why credit rationing might arise with a monopoly banking
system. One is that the maximum potential supply of funds is inadequate to meet the
demand for loans; this will be referred to as credit rationing due to insu¢cient income.T h i s
must be the case if
(1 ¡ ®)q>® w(kt) (15)
holds at date t. However, even if equation (15) fails, credit may still be rationed. This will
occur when a monopoly bank views it as too costly to generate enough deposits to fund
the complete set of potential borrowers; this will be referred to as credit rationing due to
insu¢cient saving. The following lemma states conditions under which equation (15) will
fail, and yet a monopoly bank will ration credit.23




(1 ¡ ®)q¹ v
®w(kt)
: (16)
This lemma follows directly from the monopoly bank’s maximization problem. Notice that







t+1 is the equilibrium rate of return on deposits in the absence of credit rationing.
As equation (17) makes apparent, the monopoly bank will ration credit whenever the rate
of return on deposits necessary to avoid credit rationing is “too high” relative to the return
on capital.
In addition to understanding when credit rationing will occur, in terms of interest rates,
it will also be useful to state conditions on the current capital stock that imply whether or
not credit will be rationed at date t: To do so, de…ne kSI (su¢cient income capital stock) to
be the value of the capital stock such that the wage income of all lenders is exactly equal to
the amount of funds demanded by borrowers, thus
(1 ¡ ®)q = ®w(kSI):
Clearly, for kt · kSI, credit rationing (due to insu¢cient income) must be observed. In




(1 ¡ ®)q¹ v
®w(kMSS)
:
Then, if kSI · kt · kMSS; a monopoly bank views the cost of raising enough funds to avoid
credit rationing as excessive. Again credit rationing will be observed (due to insu¢cient
saving), even though it is feasible to fund all potential borrowers. It is important to know
when kSI 7 kMSS holds. This result is stated in the following lemma.
23The lemma assumes, as does the remainder of the analysis in this section, that the distribution of returns
in the lender population is uniform.
11Lemma 3 kMSS ¸ kSI holds if and only if Ã /2 · ¹ v:
Lemma 3 asserts that kMSS ¸ kSI is satis…ed if and only if a monopoly bank views it
as uneconomical ever to tap the complete supply of deposits. For kt · max[kSI;k MSS];
a monopoly bank will ration credit. Low capital stocks are conducive to the rationing of
credit because they imply both a low level of savings, and a high opportunity cost of deposits
{see equation (12)}. Conversely, for kt ¸ max[kSI;k MSS]; a monopoly bank will fund all
potential borrowers.
5 General Equilibrium: Monopolistic Banking System
Having ascertained the various interest rates and when credit is (and is not) rationed, it is
now possible to derive the equilibrium laws of motion for the capital stock and to investigate
the properties of dynamical equilibria under a monopolistic banking system.24
Recall that there is a large number of borrowers at each date t,a n dt h a ti n v e s t m e n t
returns are iid; hence there is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy. Moreover, the per
capita capital stock at date t +1is simply the expected return on the capital investments









rt+1/½t+1 yw(kt)h(y)dy, less the amount of






.T h u st h el a w
of motion for the capital stock has the following form,



















= ½t+1´ and equation (6) into equation





























Equation (19) states that next period’s per capita capital stock is a weighted average of the
capital obtained from borrowers’ investments (inclusive of monitoring costs) and the capital
obtained from the direct (unintermediated) investments of lenders in the current period.
Under the assumption that the distribution of returns in the lender population is uniform,



































24The results from this section, as well as that of section 7, form the basis for comparison of the two
banking systems. This comparison is undertaken in section 8.
12The exact con…guration of this law of motion depends entirely upon whether or not credit
is rationed and the resulting interest rates paid on deposits.
5.1 The Equilibrium Law of Motion: Credit Rationing
When there exists credit rationing, the exact nature of equation (20) depends on whether the
credit rationing is due to insu¢cient income or saving (i.e. on whether kSI 7 kMSS holds).
Each possibility is brie‡y considered.
CASE MII (Monopoly Insu¢cient Income): kSI >k MSS (Ã /2 > ¹ v).I nt h i sc a s e
a monopoly bank o¤ers the return r¤
t+1 = ½t+1¹ v on deposits. Although the bank views it as
pro…table to attract all potential depositors, credit is rationed due to the low level of income.









Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) imply that equation (21) de…nes an increasing, concave locus,
as depicted in Figure 2.
CASE MIS (Monopoly Insu¢cient Saving): kMSS ¸ kSI (Ã/2 · ¹ v).H e r e t h e
rate of return o¤ered on deposits is r¤
t+1 = ½t+1 (Ã /2): The bank does not choose to draw
all potential deposits into the formal …nancial system. Substituting r¤
t+1 = ½t+1 (Ã /2) into






















Clearly 1 ¸ Ã /2¹ v is satis…ed, so that equation (22) also de…nes an increasing, concave locus








holds, the locus de…ned by equation (21) lies above the locus de…ned by equation(22) at
each value of kt. Assumption (A.6) states that the expected amount of capital (inclusive of
monitoring costs) generated by any borrower’s investment project is more than two-thirds
of the highest return yielded by any lender’s direct investment opportunity.25 To …x ideas, it
is henceforth assumed that (A.6) obtains, and thus that equation (21) lies everywhere above
equation (22).
5.2 The Equilibrium Law of Motion: No Credit Rationing
Credit is not rationed when kt ¸ max[kSI;k MSS]: In the absence of credit rationing, the







25The reason for this assumption is to capture the idea expressed in footnote 10 – namely, borrowers
(entrepreneurs) are endowed, on average, with more productive investment opportunities than lenders. Hence
channeling funds to borrowers, as opposed to lenders, will result in greater capital accumulation.
13for a uniform distribution of returns. Substituting equation (23) into equation (20) generates

















The following lemma characterizes some properties of the function ª(kt).
Lemma 4 The function ª(kt) satis…es



















c) ª0 (kSI)=0 ;




The proof of lemma 4 can be found in the appendix. Parts (a) and (b) of lemma 4 assert that
the equilibrium law of motion for kt is continuous as the transition from credit rationing to
a situation of no credit rationing occurs; this is true regardless of whether case MII or case
MIS obtains. The remainder of the lemma asserts that the locus de…ned by equation (24)
is a nondecreasing function that must asymptotically lie below the 45± line. Thus, Figure 2
depicts one possible con…guration of the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock in
the presence of a monopoly bank.
5.3 Steady State Equilibria
The existence of at least one non-trivial steady state capital stock equilibrium is implied by
assumptions (A.1), (A.2), and lemma 4. Whether or not there is more than one depends
heavily on parameter values, however. Several possibilities are now illustrated.
(a) Under the assumptions made to date, Figure 3a and 3b depict the possibility of a
unique nontrivial steady state equilibrium, either with or without the rationing of credit,
respectively. If there is a unique steady state, then clearly it is asymptotically stable.
(b) Figure 4 depicts the potential for the existence of more than one nontrivial steady
state. When multiple steady state equilibria exist, at most one of these can display credit
rationing (k¤
L). Moreover, if there is more than one steady state, any steady state with credit
rationing will necessarily have the lowest of the steady state capital stocks. And, clearly,
at least the lowest and highest capital stock steady states (k¤
L and k¤
H) must generically
be asymptotically stable. The possibility that more than one asymptotically stable steady
state exists raises the specter of development trap phenomena. In Figure 4, economies with
capital stocks below (above) k¤
M must converge to k¤
L (k¤
H). Moreover, under the appropriate
con…guration of parameters, economies trapped at the low real activity steady state will
also experience credit rationing. This is consistent with the description given by McKinnon
(1973) and Shaw (1973) of a variety of less developed economies.
146 Competitive Banking System
In the following two sections, the methodology of the previous two sections is repeated so as
to determine (a) the interest rates charged on loans and paid on deposits, (b) when credit
rationing exists, and (c) the properties of equilibria. The basic setup of the economy is
identical to the previous sections, except that the banking system is perfectly competitive.
I therefore proceed to characterize an equilibrium under the assumption that there is free
entry into banking, and more speci…cally, that any lender can establish a bank.
As before, it is assumed that borrowers announce loan contracts, subject to the same
feasibility and incentive constraints (equations (3) and (4)) as previously. It is also assumed
that each potential lender (bank) acts as if it can raise any quantity of deposits desired
at the market determined gross rate of return on deposits, rt+1. Clearly, then, banks will
accept loan contract o¤ers only if they o¤er an expected return no lower than the bank’s
opportunity cost of funds, inclusive of monitoring costs. Thus the loan contracts announced











xtg (z)dz ¸ rt+1: (25)
Equation (25) states that the expected real repayment implied by any loan contract an-
nouncement,
R
At Rt (z)g (z)dz+
R







g(z)dz, must at least equal the …nancial intermediaries’ costs of obtaining
funds, rt+1; per unit borrowed.
The equilibrium contract between borrowers and lenders continues to be a standard
debt contract. The borrower repays the real amount xt if z 2 Bt. If he obtains a “poor”
return on his investment, then the …nancial intermediary monitors, incurs the cost °½t+1,
and appropriates all of the borrower’s returns. These properties of an equilibrium contract
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The optimal loan contract must satisfy















qxtg (z)dz = qrt+1: (26)
Finally, in order for a full general equilibrium to obtain, it is necessary for both factor
and credit markets to “clear.” As before, an equilibrium in factor markets requires that
equations (1) and (2) hold. An equilibrium in credit markets requires that two conditions be
satis…ed. First, the per unit expected rate of return on loans must equal the per unit rate
of return on deposits. In other words, there are zero expected pro…ts for an intermediary.
Second, the quantity of funds borrowed must be equal to the quantity of funds deposited.
15Intermediaries clearly earn zero (expected) pro…ts if and only if equation (26) is satis…ed.







In addition, an equality between the quantity of funds borrowed, (1 ¡ ®)q¹t; where




















is the fraction of lenders who deposit their wage with the bank.26 As
noted by Williamson (1986), there may or may not be credit rationing in this economy, even
in the presence of a competitive banking system. Equilibrium (i.e. the interest rates charged
on loans and paid on deposits) in both the presence and absence of credit rationing is now
described.
6.1 Equilibrium Interest Rates without Credit Rationing
An equilibrium without credit rationing will satisfy equations (1), (2), (27) and (28) as well
as ¹?
t =1 : Imposing ¹?
t =1in equation (28) yields














Notice that, in the absence of credit rationing, the equilibrium rate of return on deposits is
the same under either a competitive or a monopolistic banking system. This is the case since
banks must pay a high enough return to fund all potential borrowers; the return required
does not depend on how competitive the banking system is. Thus it is not the case that
banks always make pro…ts o¤ both margins – lenders and borrowers.
However, the same is not true of the rate of interest paid by borrowers for funds. Under a
competitive banking system, the interest rate on loans, x?
t; is implicitly de…ned by equations
(27) and (30). Thus, x?











26As before, it will be assumed that the distribution of returns on own-investments in the lender population
is uniform.
166.2 Equilibrium Interest Rates with Credit Rationing
Credit is rationed at date t when there are some unfunded borrowers — that is, when ¹?
t < 1
holds — and when it is not possible for any unfunded borrower to “bid funds away” from
funded borrowers. The latter requirement translates into xt being set so as to maximize the

















= Ã, it is immediate from equation (27) that, under credit
rationing, the deposit interest rate must satisfy
r
?
t+1 = Ã½t+1: (33)
Finally, the fraction of borrowers that can be funded depends upon the supply of deposits
















The conditions necessary for credit rationing to obtain are now described.
6.3 Conditions Necessary for Credit Rationing
Credit rationing will obviously be observed if the maximum potential supply of savings
is strictly less than the demand for funds (insu¢cient income) — that is, if (1 ¡ ®)q>
®w(kt) (or in other words (kt <k SI)): However, even if there is a su¢cient supply of income
((1 ¡ ®)q · ®w(kt)), credit rationing will be observed if the value of ¹?
t given by equation
(34) is less than one. When this transpires, the supply of savings at the equilibrium rate
of return is inadequate to meet the demand (insu¢cient saving). From equation (34) it is
transparent that ¹?
t < 1 will hold if and only if
Ã<
(1 ¡ ®)q¹ v
®w(kt)
: (35)
When Ã ¸ ¹ v is satis…ed, clearly equation (35) can not hold for any kt ¸ kSI; hence credit is
rationed if and only if kt <k SI.H o w e v e r ,w h e nÃ<¹ v holds equation (35) can obtain even
if kt >k SI; in this event there is enough savings to fund all potential borrowers, but the
equilibrium rate of return is too low to draw these savings into the formal …nancial system.
De…ning the value kCSS (su¢cient savings capital stock) by
Ã =
(1 ¡ ®)q¹ v
®w(kCSS)
;
then credit rationing obtains under a competitive banking system whenever kt < max[kSI;k CSS]
holds. It is also easy to verify that the condition, kt < max[kSI;k CSS] obtains if and only if
the value of rt+1 given by equation (30) — the interest rate in the absence of credit rationing
— is greater than the interest rate given by equation (33) — the interest rate that obtains
under credit rationing.
177 General Equilibrium: A Competitive Banking Sys-
tem
As in the case of the monopoly banking system, the equilibrium law of motion for the per
capita capital stock is given by















Using equation (28) in equation (36) and under the assumption that lenders’ returns are









































The properties of this law of motion depend very strongly on whether or not credit is rationed
(and also the reason for the credit rationing). Each situation is now considered in turn.
7.1 Equilibrium Law of Motion: Credit Rationing
Even when credit rationing is observed, there are two possibilities regarding the equilibrium
law of motion for the capital stock
CASE CII (Competition Insu¢cient Income): Ã>¹ v: Here kCSS <k SI holds, and
as in case MII with a monopoly bank, all savings by lenders is intermediated. In addition, the
















It should be noted that this equilibrium law of motion coincides with that observed under
a monopoly banking system when Ã /2 > ¹ v: Consequently, equation (38) has the shape
depicted in Figure 5.
CASE CIS (Competition Insu¢cient Saving): Ã · ¹ v: Here kCSS ¸ kSI holds. In
addition, x?
t = ½t+1´ and r?
t+1 = ½t+1Ã continue to obtain, but now ½t+1Ã · ½t+1¹ v is satis…ed.
Therefore not all lenders necessarily deposit their wage income with the bank. Consequently,






















Equation (39) describes an increasing, concave locus, as depicted in Figure 5. By assumption
(A.6) this locus lies entirely below the locus de…ned by equation (38).
187.2 Equilibrium Law of Motion: No Credit Rationing
When kt ¸ max[kSI;k CSS]; credit will not be rationed; x?
t is implicitly de…ned by equation
(31) and r?
t+1 is given by equation (30). Consequently, the equilibrium law of motion for the
capital stock takes the form






















Some properties of the function © are stated in the following lemma.































c) ©0(kSI) > 0;
d) ©0 (kt) ¸ 0;
e) ª(kt) < ©(kt) · ª(kt)+( 1¡ ®)°G(´):
The proof of lemma 6 is found in the appendix. Part (a) of the lemma asserts that the
equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock is discontinuous at kt = kSI; when credit
rationing is of the case CII type. If case CIS is the relevant law of motion under credit
rationing, then part (b) of lemma 6 states that the law of motion for the capital stock is
continuous as the economy transits from a situation of credit rationing to one where credit
rationing is not observed. Parts (c) and (d) of the lemma assert that equation (40) de…nes
an increasing locus, while part (e) maintains that asymptotically the law of motion for the
capital stock must lie below the 450 line. Consequently, the equilibrium law of motion for
the capital stock in the absence of credit rationing has the general shape depicted in Figure
5
7.3 Steady State Equilibria
As is apparent from Figure 5, assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) and lemma 6 imply the existence
of at least one non-trivial steady state equilibrium in the presence of a competitive bank-
ing system. Whether or not there is more than one depends heavily on parameter values,
however. Several possibilities are now illustrated.
(a) Figure 6a (6b) depicts a situation where there is a unique steady state equilibrium.
Credit rationing does (does not) obtain in the steady state. Clearly, if there is a unique
steady state equilibrium, that equilibrium must be asymptotically stable.
(b) Figure 7 depicts a situation in which there are multiple steady state equilibria without
credit rationing and, in addition, there may be a steady state exhibiting credit rationing as
well. If there are any steady state equilibria with credit rationing, there can be at most one; it
will necessarily be asymptotically stable. In addition, there may be multiple asymptotically
stable steady state equilibria where credit rationing does not arise. Thus, “development
trap” phenomena are quite possible; two intrinsically similar economies can easily display
19quite di¤erent levels of long-run real activity. In some cases, economies “trapped” in low-
level equilibria will appear to su¤er from relatively severe credit market frictions that lead to
rationing while better-developed economies will not exhibit credit rationing, and will appear
to have better functioning …nancial systems.
8 A Comparison of Monopolistic and Competitive Bank-
ing Systems
The remainder of this paper examines how economies with competitive banking systems and
economies with more concentrated banking systems compare in terms of (a) their long-run
levels of real activity, (b) their rates of interest on loans and deposits (which will depend on
the existence and type of credit rationing), (c) the prevalence of credit rationing, and (d) the
quantity of resources consumed by the banking system. As before, it is necessary to consider
several cases, distinguished by the existence and type of credit rationing experienced by each
banking system.
8.1 Credit Rationing: Insu¢cient Income
In both economies, credit rationing is solely the result of insu¢cient income (i.e. parameter
values are such that Ã/2 > ¹ v holds and credit is rationed only when kt · kSI ). When kt ·
kSI obtains, the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock under monopoly (competitive)
banking is given by equation (21) [(38)]: obviously these coincide, see Figure 8.
For kt >k SI; the equilibrium evolution of the capital stock is governed by equation
(24) [(40)] when the banking system is monopolistic (competitive). The following proposi-
tion characterizes the relationship between the two laws of motion when there is no credit
rationing.
Proposition 7 For kt >k SI; the law of motion for a competitive system lies strictly above
that for a monopoly system.
Proposition 7 follows immediately from part (e) of lemma 6.
If credit is rationed under both a competitive and a monopolistic banking system, the
result is that the steady state capital stocks coincide. Similarly, for each asymptotically stable
steady state capital stock without credit rationing that exists under a monopoly banking
system, there exists an asymptotically stable steady state under competitive banking with a
higher capital stock. The reason for this lies in the fact that, in the absence of credit rationing,
a monopoly bank charges an excessively high rate of interest on loans. The implications of
this are examined in the following section. Finally, for an initial capital stock k0 >k SI; the
initial growth rate in capital will be greater for a competitive banking system.
8.1.1 A Comparison of Interest Rates
When Ã /2 > ¹ v holds, a monopoly banking system always results either in a higher rate of
interest on loans, or a lower rate of interest on deposits, than would be observed under a
20competitive banking system. However, only one, rather than both, of these situations obtain
at any date, as the following proposition demonstrates.
Proposition 8 Suppose that Ã /2 > ¹ v holds.
a) If kt · kSI (credit is rationed), then xt = ´½t+1 under either a monopolistic or a com-





deposit rate of interest is lower under monopoly.
b) If kt >k SI (credit is not rationed), then under monopoly (competition) xt = ´½t+1
(xt is implicitly given by equation (31)). Thus the rate of interest charged on loans is in-
creased by the presence of a monopoly banking system. The rate of interest paid on deposits,
rt+1 =( 1¡ ®)q¹ v½t+1 /®w(kt) ; i st h es a m eu n d e rt h et w os y s t e m s .
Proposition 8 follows immediately from an examination of equations (9), (12), (14), (30),
(31), (32), and (33).
8.1.2 Remarks
In the case of credit rationing (part (a)), a monopoly bank makes its pro…ts only o¤ one
margin – lenders. While there is a wedge between the interest rates paid on deposits and those
charged on loans, the reduction in the rate of interest paid on deposits by a monopoly bank
(relative to a competitive bank) has no consequences for capital accumulation; it represents
a pure redistribution of income from depositors to the owners of the bank.
However, the higher rate of interest charged on loans (part(b)) does have an implication
for the capital stock. An increase in the loan rate of interest obligates a monopoly bank
to monitor borrowers with a higher probability than would be observed under competition.
This is socially wasteful, and also accounts for the reduction in the capital stock. Thus
the analysis predicts that, when insu¢cient income is the only reason for credit rationing,
concentration in the banking system is detrimental to capital formation if and only if a
monopoly banking system engages in “excessive” state veri…cation; this will occur whenever
credit is not rationed. Finally, this also makes it more likely that a development trap will
arise when there exists multiple steady state equilibria.
8.2 Credit Rationing: Insu¢cient Income and Insu¢cient Saving
In this case, credit rationing occurs for di¤erent reasons in the two economies (i.e. para-
meter values satisfy Ã>¹ v>Ã/2). For this con…guration of parameters, credit rationing
occurs under a monopoly banking system as a result of insu¢cient saving (i.e. if and only
if kt · kMSS). Credit rationing will arise with competitive banks as a result of insu¢cient
income (i.e. only when kt · kSI <k MSS). Thus, for kt 2 (kSI;k MSS); the existence of
monopoly banking will lead to credit rationing that would not be observed under a competi-
tive …nancial system. The di¤erence arises because, when Ã>¹ v>Ã/2 holds, a competitive
banking system draws all potential depositors into the formal …nancial sector. However, a
monopolistic bank views it as too costly to do so. Thus more savings must be generated
under monopoly — that is, there must be a larger current capital stock and a larger current
income level — to fund all potential borrowers than is the case under competition.
21For kt · (¸) kMSS; the law of motion for the capital stock is given by equation (22) [(24)]
under monopoly. For kt · (¸) kSI; the law of motion for the capital stock is given by equation
(38) [(40)] under competition. These observations, along with assumption (A.6), imply that
the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock of an economy with a competitive banking
system lies everywhere above the corresponding law of motion for the capital stock of an
otherwise identical economy, but with a monopolistic banking system: see Figure 9.
The immediate implication of this fact is that, for every asymptotically stable steady
state equilibrium under monopoly banking, there exists some asymptotically stable steady
state equilibrium under competition with a larger capital stock. This result arises for a
combination of three reasons. (a) As before, when neither a competitive nor a monopolistic
banking system gives rise to credit rationing, excessive state veri…cation occurs in a monopo-
listic banking system. (b) Moreover, credit rationing is more likely to occur under monopoly
banking (in particular, when kSI <k t <k MSS ), preventing some relatively productive
investments from being undertaken. (c) Finally, when credit is rationed under either bank-
ing system, a monopolistic banking system draws fewer depositors into the formal …nancial
system, so that again fewer high productivity investments are undertaken.
8.2.1 A Comparison of Interest Rates
In section 8.1.1 (when Ã /2 > ¹ v), the existence of monopoly power in banking necessarily
resulted in either a higher rate of interest charged on loans, or a lower rate of interest
paid on deposits. However, both situations did not occur simultaneously. The situation is
substantially di¤erent here, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Suppose that Ã>¹ v>Ã/2 holds.
a) If kt · kSI (credit is rationed under competition as well as under monopoly), then the
interest rate charged on loans is identical under either a competitive or a monopoly banking
system. A monopolistic banking system pays a lower rate of interest on deposits.
b) If kt ¸ kMSS (credit is not rationed, either under competition or monopoly), then a
monopolistic banking system charges a higher rate of interest on loans than a competitive
banking system, but pays the same rate of interest on deposits.
c) If kt 2 (kSI;k MSS) (a monopoly banking system rations credit whereas a competitive one
does not), then a monopoly banking system charges a higher rate of interest on loans, and
pays a lower rate of interest on deposits, than a competitive banking system.
Proposition 9 follows from equations (9), (12), (14), (30), (31), (32), and (33).
8.2.2 Remarks
Relative to proposition 8, proposition 9 di¤ers only in that there is now an interval of
current capital stock (kSI;k MSS); where credit rationing is observed with a monopolistic,
but not with a competitive banking system. Overall however, in this case a monopoly
tends to be more detrimental to the economy. In particular, as before in part (a) there is
a di¤erence (between a monopoly and competitive bank) in interest rates paid on deposits
(and not between interest rates charged on loans). However, unlike the previous case, this
now results in less capital accumulation and slower growth. This results from a su¢ciently
22low interest rate being paid on deposits by a monopoly bank that some lenders decide to
forgo the formal …nancial markets and undertake their own investment project; this leads
to less capital accumulation relative to a competitive system where only (more productive)
borrowers undertake investment.
For values of kt in the interval (kSI;k MSS) (i.e. part (c)), a monopolistic banking system
operates to the simultaneous detriment of both borrowers and lenders, ceteris paribus. In
this case pro…ts are made o¤ both margins resulting in excess monitoring and less investment
being undertaken by (more productive) borrowers. Part (b) is essentially identical to that of
the previous section. Finally, as before, given the relative positions of the equilibrium laws
of motion for the two banking systems, it is obvious that a competitive system will, for a
given initial capital stock, experience greater initial growth and be less likely to converge to
the steady state with the lowest level capital stock – thus avoiding a development trap.
8.3 Credit Rationing: Insu¢cient Saving
In this …nal case, credit rationing in both economies again occurs for the identical reasons:
namely insu¢cient saving. When ¹ v>Ãholds, a monopolistic (competitive) banking system
rations credit if and only if kt · kMSS (kCSS) is satis…ed and thus all credit rationing is the
result of insu¢cient saving. Since kCSS <k MSS holds, again the range of potential current
capital stocks can be partitioned into three intervals, see Figure 10. (a) For kt · kCSS;
credit rationing is observed under both a monopolistic and a competitive banking system.
(b) For kt 2 (kCSS;k MSS); credit rationing is observed if the banking system is monopolistic,
but not if it is competitive. (c) For kt ¸ kMSS; credit rationing does not arise under either
monopoly or competition. This is qualitatively similar to the situation discussed in section
8.2. And, indeed, all of the results and remarks described in that section apply to this case
as well.
9C o n c l u s i o n
Recent literature has established a strong positive correlation between …nancial market de-
velopment and real economic performance. However, what is less well-understood is how
the level of competition in …nancial markets a¤ects either the development of the …nancial
system, or the level of real activity (or its rate of growth). This paper attempts to shed some
light on this issue.
As a practical matter, many economies have banking systems that are less competitive
and more monopolistic in nature. The analysis of this paper indicates that in some — but
not all — cases, monopoly in banking can be expected to result in both a lower long-run
capital stock, and a slower rate of growth (conditional on the level of the current capital
stock) than would be the case in the presence of a competitive banking system. Moreover,
it has also been shown exactly when a monopolistic …nancial system will and will not be
detrimental to the long-run level of real activity and how this detrimental e¤ect depends on
the existence and the particular type of credit rationing which may arise.
Banks with monopoly power will, naturally, manipulate rates of return on loans, and/or
deposits, to enhance their own pro…ts. However, as shown, it is not necessarily the case that
23they always simultaneous manipulate both interest rates. If savings are not very interest
elastic, as most evidence suggests, then a reduction in the rate of interest paid on deposits
by a monopoly bank does not have a detrimental e¤ect on capital formation, although it
does redistribute income from bank depositors to the owner of the bank. However, when
monopoly power in banking raises the rate of interest charged on loans, this leads to excessive
monitoring by the …nancial system. This is detrimental to capital formation as well as being
socially wasteful.
The existence of monopoly power in banking also has implications for the amount of credit
rationing that might be observed, in equilibrium. Credit rationing is a natural phenomenon
arising either because demand exceeds the total supply of funds available in the economy, or
because banks do not generate enough deposits by their choice of rates of return on deposits.
This paper has shown that, in general, there will be situations where a competitive banking
system will not ration credit (because they pay a su¢ciently high interest rate) while at
the same time a monopoly banking system will ration credit (because it is pro…table to
depress the rate of return on deposits). In this case, a monopoly bank o¤ers both a lower
return on deposits and charges a higher interest rate on loans than would be observed with
a competitive banking system.
If the economy exhibits credit rationing under both types of banking systems, then it
w i l lb et h ec a s et h a tb o r r o w e r sa r ec h a r g e dt h es a m ei n t e r e s tr a t ei ne i t h e rs y s t e m .H o w e v e r ,
in this case a monopoly bank may o¤er either the same or a lower interest rate on deposits
than a competitive banking system (depending on the relative returns from borrowers’ and
lenders’ investment opportunities). Conversely, when there is no credit rationing in either
system, then it is lenders who experience the same rate of return independent of the nature of
the banking system, while a monopoly bank charges a higher interest rate on funds borrowed.
Consequently, it is not the case that a monopolistic banking system always charges higher
prices for funds lent or that it always o¤ers lower returns on funds deposited, when compared
with a competitive banking system.
A …nal result of this paper deals with developing economies and the existence of devel-
opment trap phenomena. It is possible in an economy with either type of banking system
to be stuck at a low capital stock steady state equilibrium characterized by credit rationing.
However, because of the potential discontinuities associated with the equilibrium law of mo-
tion for the capital stock of an economy with a competitive banking system, it is less likely
that economies with competitive banking systems will experience development traps.
There are several dimensions along which the analysis undertaken here can be extended.
One obvious extension would be to consider an economy with more than one bank, but
in which each bank has some power to a¤ect prices. This intermediate situation between
pure monopoly and perfect competition obviously would constitute a better representation
of the …nancial systems of a number of economies. Second, in the present model there is
only a single asset, there is no government sector, and banks are not regulated. Exploring
the desirability of regulatory intervention, and allowing some scope for …scal and monetary
policy to a¤ect the operation of the …nancial system would be important topics for further
investigation.
2410 Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 4
The …rst two parts of lemma 4 are obtained by simply evaluating ª(kt) at kSI and kMSS,
and using the de…nitions





(1 ¡ ®)q¹ v
®w(kMSS)
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From the de…nition of kSI (as stated above), ª0 (kSI)=0follows immediately. Moreover,
since (1 ¡ ®)q<® w(kt) must obtain in the absence of credit rationing, ª0 (kt) > 0; for all
kt ¸ kSI; clearly holds. Part (e) follows immediately from the fact that limkt!1 w(kt)/kt =0
holds.
B Proof of Lemma 6
Parts (a) and (b) are easily obtained by evaluating ©(kt) at kSI and kCSS respectively, and
using the de…nitions
(1 ¡ ®)q ´ ®w(kSI)
and
Ã ´
(1 ¡ ®)q¹ v
®w(kCSS)
:
The continuity of the equilibrium law of motion depends on whether or not case CII
or case CIS obtains. In a case CII economy, the equilibrium law of motion for the capital






































hold. Therefore the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock is discontinuous at
kt = kSI:
25In a case CIS economy, credit rationing does (does not) obtain for kt < (>) kCSS: When
















































Thus, in this case the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock is continuous.
For part (c) and (d), di¤erentiating equation (40) yields
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/dkt < 0: Moreover ª0 (kt) ¸ 0 is also satis…ed,
yielding ©0 (kt) ¸ 0. Part (c) follows immediately from ª0(kSI)=0 .
Finally, for part (e) a comparison of equations (24) and (40) indicates that ©(kt) > ª(kt)







: But this is immediate from the fact that x?
t <´ ½ t+1
whenever credit is not rationed. Moreover,








· (1 ¡ ®)°G(´);
establishing the result.
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